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The  average  level  of  schooling,  the  dispersion  of  educational  levels  and  the  extent  to  which 







and  autonomy,  academic  selection,  are  all  features  that  may  affect  both  the  mean  and  the 
distribution  of  educational  attainments,  thus  shaping  efficiency  and  equity  of  each  schooling 
system.  Understanding  how  and  to  what  extent  these  institutional  features  affect  countries’ 








with  tertiary  education.  Previous  literature  investigating  the  role  of  school  institutions  on 
educational attainment has mainly focused on either country‐specific episodes, or cross‐country 
evidence,  but  mostly  focussing  on  single  dimensions.  In  the  former  approach,  the  effects  of 
institutional features are identified exploiting the variation of educational policies across regions 



























































achievement,  largely  focussing  on  cross‐country  studies.  The  surveyed  papers  are  grouped 












































effect  on  subsequent  cognitive  achievement  (somewhat  higher  for  children  from  poor 






associated  with  cognitive  performance  in  middle  school.  They  also  show  that  more  extensive 
systems of pre‐school education – in terms of both enrolment and duration – significantly increase 



















exogenous  variation  provided  by  minimum  school  leaving  age  laws  to  identify  the  effect  of 
education on earnings using data from 12 European countries. They find that compulsory school 
reforms  significantly  affect  educational  attainment




top  quantile.  They  explain  the  significant  effect  also  on  individuals  with  higher  educational 
attainment,  by  arguing  that  “better  educated  individuals  react  to  increases  in  compulsory 




Murtin  and  Viarengo  (2011)  study  the  expansion  of  compulsory  schooling  in  fifteen  Western 
European countries over 1950–2000 and investigate the effectiveness of this policy to increase 








do  not  find  significant  net  effect  on  adult  labour  market  outcomes  of  lowering  entry  age (at 
kindergarten level) in a sample of US population. On the other side, combining data from US, UK 
and  Canada  at  state/region  level  Oreopulos  (2007)  shows  that  rising  school  leaving  age  is 
beneficial in terms of lifetime wealth, health and happiness. 
 








characterised  by  tracking  when  children  are  allocated  –  at  some  stages  of  their  career  –  to 
different  tracks,  characterised  by  different  curricula  offered  (generally  distinguishing  between 
academic or vocational education) and different average ability of the enrolled students. School 


























and  Ammermuller  (2005)  adopts  similar  identification  strategy  (differences‐in‐differences 









shown  that  having  attended  vocational  schools  (at  secondary  or  tertiary  level)  provides  an 
advantage in the short run (represented by a higher probability of employment), which decays 














background  on  pupils’  attainment  and  therefore  increases  educational  inequality.  It  has  also 








Pupils’  educational  attainment  can  also  be  affected  by  the  extent  of  school  accountability, 
generally proxied by the presence or not of external exit exams. As summarised in Woessmann 
(2007), cross‐country evidence indicates that introducing accountability by externally testing and 









school  performance.  However,  the  impact  of  these  policies  in  terms  of  inequality  and  other 
aspects than performance are not clear yet. Hanushek and Raymond (2003) review the literature 






value‐added,  they  may  give  undue  advantages  to  schools  serving  students  from  high  socio‐
economic backgrounds (Ladd and Walsh, 2002; Schuetz, West and Woessmann, 2007). Even in the 







empirical  works  that  have  specifically  looked  at  the  impact  of  accountability  on  educational 
inequality. For  the  US,  Hanushek and  Raymond  (2004,  2005)  find  a  positive  impact  of  school 
accountability on average students’ achievement; in terms of distributional effects, they show that 










external  exit  exams  on  student  performance  and  finds  heterogeneous  effects  depending  on 
students’ backgrounds, students’ ability and schools’ specific settings, as well as increasing effects 
over the course of secondary education. Using also quantile regressions to estimate the effect of 











































Measuring  teaching  quality  is  complicated  because  the  most  common  observable  teachers' 
characteristics  (such  as  gender,  age,  qualifications  or  experience)  appear  to  be  relatively 
uncorrelated to (unobservable) teachers’ quality as estimated from students’ testing scores, once 
family  and  school  effects  are  taken  into  account  (Krueger,  1999;  Rivkin,  Hanushek,  and  Kain, 
2005).  There  is  a  large  literature  that  investigates  the  role  of  teacher  quality  and  teacher 





and  students  performance  observed  in  a  cross‐country  perspective  (Dolton  and  Marcenaro‐
Gutierrez, 2011). Most of the recent policy recommendations to improve educational systems 
point  to  attracting,  motivating  and  retaining  good  teachers.  There  is  significant  differences  in 







Several  studies  have  suggested  that  liquidity  constraints  may  prevent  the  children  of  poorer 
households  from  proceeding  in  their  educational  career  up  to  secondary  and  tertiary  levels 





Without  a  clear  understanding  of  how  financial  constraints  works  in  limiting  the  choice  set 
(through heterogeneity in risk aversion correlated with wealth possession ? through debt aversion 







students,  with  publicly  guaranteed  loans  to  students,  may  reduce  college  attendance, 






amortisation  period).  Despite  this,  in  many  countries  the  take‐up  rate  remains  low,  students 














There  is  a  wide  and  mostly  descriptive  literature  on  cross  country  differences  in  university 
governance (Teichler 2007, Eurydice 2008). Most European countries experienced a significant 
expansion in tertiary education enrolment in the recent decades, without sizeable changes in the 
internal  organisation.  The  vast  majority  of  European  universities  are  centrally  organised  and 
financed, and this reduce the internal degree of competition, especially when compared to US 
universities.  Jacobs  and  van  der  Ploeg  (2006)  have  clearly  described  the  outcome  of  such 
framework: “European universities seem more comfortable providing a decent education for all 
with  not  much  selection  based  on  national  exams  and/or  interviews  or  exams  set  by  the 
universities themselves. Of course, abstaining from selection may be a legitimate policy choice, but 
it hurts efficiency and excellence. One big consequence is that there will be less competition on 
academic  excellence  among  secondary  schools,  especially  if  there  is  no  national  exam  or  the 




























































































































students,  which  may  affect  incentives  or  discouragements  for  student  achievements  (Bratti, 
Checchi and Filippin 2011, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer 2011). Other institutional features that affect 
class composition and (potential) peer effect are the practice of grade repetition, namely students 















failed  attempt  and/or  early  drop  out  events,  which  typically  remain  hidden  when  using  the 









































European  countries/regions  (Austria,  Belgium  (Flanders),  Belgium  (French),  Czech  Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 


















other  attempts  to  build  summary  indexes  capable  to  account  for  salient  features  of  national 
educational systems.
16 Despite a wide information available for each country (think of the various 



















improve  the  quality  of  the  education  provision.  Thus  we  combine  level  measures  (age  and 




should  identify  the  impact  of  each  institutional  dimension  of  the  educational  system,  from 
kindergarten to university. 
 







United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO)  country  reports,  or 
OECD  Education  at  a  Glance,  and  using  country  specific  documents  and  direct  contact  with 
national experts. 
  
The  resulting  original  dataset  contains  yearly  observations  over  the  1930‐2000  period  for  24 








                                                 
17 National Education System Descriptions are highly detailed reports on education systems covered by the Eurydice 
Network and updated annually by the National Units in the Network. Each country description is structured into 11 

























































































































retain  unitary  variation.  Notice  that  the  decomposition  of  the  standard  deviation  into  the 
























(within)  Min Max  Obs.  N. of 
countries 
Pre-primary expansion  0.396  0.451  0.233  0.389  0  1 1728  24 
Pre-primary teacher qualification  0.272  0.400  0.215  0.341  0  1 1728  24 
Duration compulsory school  8.146  1.871  1.100  1.530  3  13 1728  24 
Beginning age of compulsory education  6.376  0.761  0.705  0.320  4  9 1728  24 
Leaving age of compulsory education  14.522  1.658  0.860  1.428  10  18 1728  24 
Primary teacher qualification  0.352  0.417  0.200  0.368  0  1 1728  24 
Secondary teacher qualification  0.402  0.446  0.235  0.381  0  1 1728  24 
Tracking age  13.119  2.268  1.687  1.555  6  16 1728  24 
Standardised tests (for career advancement)  0.120  0.316  0.203  0.246  0  1 1728  24 
Standardised tests (for other purposes)  0.104  0.305  0.157  0.263  0  1 1728  24 
School evaluation  0.121  0.323  0.100  0.307  0  1 1728  24 
School autonomy   0.181  0.383  0.167  0.347  0  1 1728  24 
Teacher autonomy   0.211  0.408  0.245  0.330  0  1 1728  24 
Selectivity in university access  0.378  0.471  0.359  0.317  0  1 1224  17 
Expansion of university access  0.317  0.421  0.163  0.390  0  1 1728  24 
Increase grant size  0.539  0.165  0.065  0.152  0.25  1 1224  17 
Loan component to grant component   0.275  0.280  0.270  0.097  0  1 1224  17 
Interest rate  0.275  0.275  0.270  0.083  0  1 1224  17 
Index of university autonomy  0.16  0.27  0.09  0.26  0  0.86 1296  18 







































































Pre-primary expansion  1                     
Pre-primary teacher qualification  0.4627*  1                   
Duration compulsory school  0.3996*  0.3533*  1                  
Beginning age of comp. education  0.1088*  0.0630*  -0.4678*  1                 
Leaving age of comp. education  0.5010*  0.4277*  0.9139*  -0.0687*  1                
Primary teacher qualification  0.5433*  0.5627*  0.4965*  -0.0963*  0.5162*  1               
Secondary teacher qualification  0.5816*  0.3954*  0.5453*  -0.2070*  0.5205*  0.7157*  1              
Tracking age  0.3555*  0.3914*  0.2019*  0.3184*  0.3741*  0.2722*  0.1969*  1             
Standardised tests (for career adv.)  -0.0031  0.1210*  0.2416*  -0.1060*  0.2240*  0.0395  0.1404*  0.0107  1            
Standardised tests (for other purp.)  0.1238*  0.2271*  0.3308*  -0.1827*  0.2894*  0.3514*  0.1664*  0.1580*  0.2848*  1           
School evaluation  0.3582*  0.2816*  0.4103*  -0.2384*  0.3536*  0.3986*  0.4209*  0.0249  0.3361*  0.3520*  1          
School autonomy   0.3288* 0.3317* 0.4282* -0.2246* 0.3802* 0.4199* 0.4483* 0.1777* 0.2551* 0.2884* 0.5884*  1               
Teacher autonomy   0.1173* 0.1364* 0.2915* -0.2628* 0.2083* 0.2294* 0.2443* 0.0091 0.2602* 0.1637* 0.3768* 0.5998*  1             
Selectivity in university access†  0.1663* 0.3169* 0.3691* -0.0811* 0.3936* 0.2023* 0.1388* 0.2753* 0.3627* 0.2712* 0.2035* 0.0574* 0.0579*  1           
Expansion of university access  0.4646* 0.4040* 0.5096* -0.1788* 0.4931* 0.5864* 0.5549* 0.3161* 0.2030* 0.2583* 0.4435* 0.5164* 0.2653* 0.3376*  1         
Increase grant size†  0.3097* 0.1430* 0.0934* -0.0047 0.1056* 0.2463* 0.2555* 0.1130* 0.1125* 0.2380* 0.3136* 0.2419* 0.0595* 0.1812* 0.2145*  1       
Loan to grant component †  0.0328  0.0448 0.1516* 0.1630* 0.2361* 0.1703* -0.0351 0.3214* 0.1924* 0.0154  -0.036  0.1095* 0.1490* 0.3761* 0.1457* 0.0700*  1     
Interest rate†  0.1293* 0.0015 -0.0379 0.3020* 0.0710* 0.1528* -0.0512 0.3125* -0.1969* 0.0115 -0.1138* 0.0913* -0.0615*  -0.0646* 0.1309* 0.0849* 0.5824*  1   










surveys:  the  European  Social  Survey  (ESS)










indicator  of  the  duration  of  formal  schooling,  measured  by  the  number  of  actual  (full‐time 
equivalent) years of education completed. The main advantage of this variable is that years of 


















to  individuals  aged  more  than  25,  in  order  to  minimise  the  number  of  people  who  did  not 
                                                 


















































     ESS       EUSILC    
Birth year   109415  1955  14.83 1926 1985 159895 1960  11.14  1939 1980
Age  109415  50  15 25 84 159895 45  11.14  25 66
Female  109415  0.53  0.50 0 1 159895 0.52  0.50  0 1
Years of education  109415  12  4 0 25 159895 12.51  4.46  0 25
Highest qualification achieved 
Primary education or below  109097  0.15  0.36 0 1 159786 0.15  0.36  0 1
Lower secondary education   109097  0.19  0.39 0 1 159786 0.14  0.35  0 1
Upper secondary education   109097  0.38  0.49 0 1 159786 0.45  0.50  0 1
Tertiary education  109097  0.28  0.45 0 1 159786 0.25  0.44  0 1
Parental highest qualification achieved 
Primary education or below  109415  0.35  0.48 0 1 159895 0.48  0.50  0 1
Lower secondary education   109415  0.22  0.41 0 1 159895 0.17  0.38  0 1
Upper secondary education   109415  0.28  0.45 0 1 159895 0.24  0.43  0 1
Tertiary education  109415  0.15  0.36 0 1 159895 0.11  0.31  0 1
            
     IALS       ISSP    
Birth year   31592  1953  11 1926 1973 28200 1949  13  1926 1974
Age  31592  43  11 25 68 28200 45  13  25 73
Female  31592  0.54  0.50 0 1 28200 0.52  0.50  0 1
Years of education  31592  12.04  3.49 0 25 28200 11.28  3.91  0 25
Highest qualification achieved 
Primary education or below  31308  0.11  0.31 0 1 21543 0.06  0.24  0 1
Lower secondary education   31308  0.29  0.46 0 1 21543 0.48  0.50  0 1
Upper secondary education   31308  0.35  0.48 0 1 21543 0.32  0.47  0 1
Tertiary education  31308  0.25  0.43 0 1 21543 0.14  0.34  0 1
Parental highest qualification achieved 
Primary education or below  31592  0.33  0.47 0 1 28200 0.20  0.40  0 1
Lower secondary education   31592  0.35  0.48 0 1 28200 0.59  0.49  0 1
Upper secondary education   31592  0.22  0.41 0 1 28200 0.15  0.35  0 1
Tertiary education  31592  0.11  0.32 0 1 28200 0.07  0.25  0 1
 












2010  for  other  applications  of  inequality  measures  to  the  educational  context)  and  Atkinson 
indices with different inequality aversion parameters.  
 
Figure  1  scatter  plots  the  relationship  between  average  years  of  education  and  the  Gini 
concentration  index








and  Spain)  are  characterised  by  the  highest  levels  of  educational  inequality,  while  eastern 
countries benefited by free access to education in the communist era which translates in lower 
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Average years of education
 
 
                                                 
26 Both Gini and Atkinson indexes are not strictly applicable to the distribution of years of education, since such an 
















































countries  over  70  years  and  we  identify  the  effect  of  reforms  exploiting  the  cross‐country 
heterogeneity in the timing of their implementation. More specifically, we correlate changes in 
educational  attainment  in  subsequent  cohorts  in  each  country  with  possibly  occurred  policy 
changes. 
The intuition behind our identification strategy is that used in the traditional diff‐in‐diff approach. 
Suppose we had two countries  A and  B identical in any respect at time  t. At time  1  t  an 
educational reform is exogenously introduced in country  A. The effect of this reform can be then 













The  first  one  is  that  changes  in  individual  outcomes  of  two  consecutive  cohorts  in  different 
countries would have been the same in the absence of the reforms. The second assumption is that 
the treatment (i.e. having been exposed to a particular institutional school setting) is assigned to 










  ict c s t c ict n t c ict ict PB R F h                         ,   (1) 
 
where i, c and t denote individual, country and birth cohort respectively;  ict h  is our outcome of 
interest (years of schooling of individual i in country c born in year t),  ict F  is a gender indicator 
(1=female),  n t c R  ,   is  the  institutional  setting  prevailing  in  country  c  at  time   n t    where  n  
captures the age at which the reform is supposed to affect individuals educational career
28;  ict PB  
is a measure of family background (captured by a dichotomous variable that takes value one if at 
least one parent has tertiary education),  c  ,  t   and  s   are country, birth year and survey fixed 
effects  (controlling  for  all  time‐invariant  country  specific  characteristics  and  for  all  the  time‐
specific shocks that affected all countries simultaneously), and  c     is a country specific time 












                                                 







    ict c t c ict n t c ict n t c ict ict PB R PB R F h                            , ,   (2) 
 
The  differential  effect  of  the  reform  in  the  culturally  different  subgroups  is  given  by       for 





We  want  then  to  move  a  step  further  and  investigate  whether  educational  reforms  have 
differential impacts along the distribution of educational attainment. It may well be the case that 
some reforms do not affect the mean educational level, but only impact educational attainment of 










we  compute  for  each  cell  (countrycohortsurvey)  the  value  of  different  percentiles  of  the 
dependent variable distribution
29.  
If  pct h  denotes the 
th p  percentile of the individual distribution of attainment in country  c for 
cohort  t, then we estimate the following equation, where    90 , 80 , 70 , 60 , 50 , 40 , 30 , 20 , 10  p  and 
c  ,  t  ,  s   are respectively country, cohort and survey fixed effects. 
 
  pct s c t n t c p p pct R h               ,   (3) 
 










  ct s c t cts cts n t c cts cts F PB R h Ineq                        ,   (4) 





where  cts Ineq  is the inequality outcome of interest (either the Gini index or the Atkinson index) for 
country  c and cohort  t in survey  s ,  cts h  is the average years of education of the same cohort, 
n t c R  ,   is  the  reform  measure  associated  to  cohort  t  in  country  c,  cts PB   is  the  fraction  of 
individuals with at least one parent with tertiary education in a given cohort,  cts F  is the fraction of 






























is  the  starting  age  of  compulsory  school  (column  4)  the  lower  is  the  successive  attainment, 
suggesting  that  lowering  the  beginning  age  of  compulsory  education  is  an  effective  tool  to 


















The  introduction  of  standardised  tests  aimed  at  guiding  career  advancement  (column  9)  is 
associated to a reduction in average educational attainment, implying that students would be 
discouraged  by  lower  test  scores  in  proceeding  further  in  education.  On  the  other  hand, 
standardised tests introduced for other reasons, such as school evaluation (column 10), seem to 





In  contrast,  a  composite  measure  for  different  dimension  of  university  autonomy  obtains  a 
negative and significant sign (column 19). This is not surprising, because the secondary school level 
has typically a mission of expanding school participation, and it pursues it also by adapting to the 
local  environment.  On  the  contrary,  tertiary  education  institutions  can  make  use  of  greater 
autonomy  to  improve  their  competitiveness  in  the  higher  education  market,  not  necessarily 
leading to larger student attendance. 
vii) finally policies to foster tertiary education show positive association with average educational 










average  educational  attainment  of  the  corresponding  populations,  while  policies  targeted  to 








wiii)  reforms  have  differentiated effects according  to  family  background.  In  table  8  we  have 
reported the average impact (from table 6 for ease of comparison) and the impact by family 
background (from table 7). We notice that in most cases reforms tend to have an attenuated 















which  now  has  positive  impact  on  both  groups),  primary  and  secondary  school  teacher 
qualification (columns 6 and 7),  tracking age (column 8 – negligible impact on both groups of 
































































  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Graduate parent   3.011***  3.012***  3.010***  3.012***  3.011***  3.012***  3.011***  3.011***  3.013***  3.011*** 
  [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.042] 
Reform 0.132***  -0.191***  0.061***  -0.607***  0.048***  -0.000  0.169***  0.012  -0.432***  0.429*** 
  [0.049] [0.044] [0.014] [0.117] [0.014] [0.054] [0.048] [0.010]  [0.076]  [0.090] 
                                
Obs.  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102 
R²  0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258  0.258  0.258 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24  24  24 
























  (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)    
Graduate parent   3.012***  3.012***  3.012***  3.019***  3.011***  3.019***  3.022***  3.020***  3.008***   
  [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.055] [0.042] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055]  [0.051]   
Reform 0.017  0.133  -0.021  -0.176**  0.171***  0.235  -0.830***  -1.010***  -0.209**   
  [0.108] [0.087] [0.063] [0.077] [0.050] [0.147] [0.196] [0.340]  [0.095]   
              
Obs.  329 102  329 102  329 102  224 969  329 102  224 969  224 969  224 969  240 482   
R²  0.258 0.258 0.258 0.287 0.258 0.287 0.287 0.287  0.283   







































  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Graduate parent   3.207***  3.125***  6.816***  2.737***  10.562***  3.478***  3.319***  5.129***  3.105***  3.073*** 
  [0.056] [0.053] [0.218] [0.419] [0.435] [0.061] [0.066] [0.298]  [0.043]  [0.044] 
Reform 0.195***  -0.123***  0.111***  -0.613***  0.104***  0.111**  0.224***  0.028***  -0.295***  -0.956*** 
  [0.050] [0.047] [0.014] [0.117] [0.014] [0.056] [0.050] [0.010]  [0.084]  [0.099] 
Reformgraduate parent  -0.573*** -0.515*** -0.436***  0.044  -0.503*** -1.156*** -0.588*** -0.160***  -1.089***  0.635*** 
  [0.104] [0.107] [0.024] [0.065] [0.029] [0.090] [0.089] [0.021]  [0.152]  [0.096] 
                                
Observations  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102  329 102 
R²  0.258 0.258 0.260 0.258 0.261 0.259 0.258 0.259  0.258  0.258 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24  24  24 
























  (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)    
Graduate parent   3.032***  3.062***  3.134***  3.598***  3.438***  3.618***  3.960***  3.371***  3.535***   
  [0.042] [0.045] [0.047] [0.078] [0.058] [0.165] [0.077] [0.091]  [0.063]   
Reform 0.223**  0.206**  0.089  0.049  0.269***  0.501***  0.246  -0.643*  0.123   
  [0.096] [0.089] [0.063] [0.080] [0.051] [0.143] [0.194] [0.338]  [0.101]   
Reformgraduate parent  -1.219*** -0.612*** -0.789*** -1.217*** -0.883*** -1.127*** -2.778*** -1.041***  -2.169***   
  [0.204] [0.096] [0.088] [0.101] [0.104] [0.274] [0.148] [0.191]  [0.142]   
                               
Observations  329 102  329 102  329 102  224 969  329 102  224 969  224 969  224 969  240 482   
R²  0.258 0.258 0.258 0.289 0.258 0.287 0.290 0.288  0.285   





































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
average  effect  0.132 -0.191 0.061 -0.607 0.048  0  0.169 0.012 -0.432 0.429 
parent  without  college  0.20 -0.12 0.11 -0.61 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.03 -0.30 -0.96 
parent  with  college  -0.38 -0.64 -0.33 -0.57 -0.40 -1.05 -0.36 -0.13 -1.38 -0.32 














Loan to grant 





  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)   
average effect  0.017  0.133  -0.021  -0.176  0.171  0.235  -0.83  -1.01  -0.209   
parent  without  college  0.22 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.50 0.25 -0.64 0.12   

































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Reform  -0.093 0.448***  -0.135*** 0.437 -0.121*** 0.214 -0.368**  -0.109*** 0.560*  0.002 
  [0.192] [0.162] [0.038] [0.303] [0.036] [0.197] [0.163] [0.039] [0.325] [0.172] 
Observations  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362  1 362 
R²  0.512 0.514 0.515 0.513 0.514 0.512 0.513 0.516 0.514 0.512 














Loan to grant 





  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)   
Reform -0.584*  0.114  0.369**  0.098  -0.482***  -0.838***  -0.398  -0.398  -0.136   
  [0.302] [0.183] [0.169] [0.166] [0.144] [0.278] [0.354] [0.354] [0.373]   
Observations  1 362  1 362  1 362  961# 1  362 961# 961# 961# 1020##  











deciles  of  the  distribution  of  educational  attainment.







construction  affects  those  who  choose  at  least  secondary  school  or  more),  the  increase  in 
teachers’ qualification (again at secondary level) and the enhancing of selective access to college 
(trough  admission  tests).  Some  other  reforms  contribute  to  make  the  educational  attainment 


























































Table 10: Impact of reforms on educational inequality: Dependent variable: Atkinson index ( 2   ) 
 



























  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Mean years of education  ‐0.010*** ‐ 0.010*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.010*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.010*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.010*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Share of people with graduate parent  0.061***  0.061***  0.064***  0.061***  0.064***  0.060***  0.058***  0.055***  0.053***  0.060*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Reform  ‐0.002 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.002***  0.031*** ‐ 0.002**  0.011*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.004***  0.022***  0.018*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
            
Observations  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368  3,368 
R²  0.687  0.687  0.688  0.688  0.688  0.688  0.688  0.692  0.690  0.688 
            














Loan to grant 




  (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)    
Mean years of education  ‐0.010*** ‐ 0.010*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.011*** ‐ 0.009*** ‐ 0.011*** ‐ 0.011*** ‐ 0.011*** ‐ 0.011***   
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   
Share of people with graduate parent  0.062***  0.061***  0.058***  0.081***  0.061***  0.079***  0.089***  0.085***  0.080***   
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)   
Reform  0.012**  0.009**  0.027***  0.007** ‐ 0.013***  0.012 ‐ 0.046*** ‐ 0.041***  0.009*   
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.005)   
            
Observations  3,368  3,368  3,368  2,271  3,368  2,271  2,271  2,271  2,461   
















of  the  ten  countries  included  in  all  the  surveys











Finally,  we  performed  the  analysis  on  the  distributional  effects  of  reforms  using  alternative 
measures of inequality, namely the Gini index and Atkinson 0.5. Although different indices are 








educational  attainments  in  the  population.  Our  main  claim  is  that  reforming  educational 
institutions has a causal impact on individual choices. Several arguments support this claim. First 
of  all,  reforms  are  exogenous  to  individual  choice.  Not  only  reform variables  are  matched  to 
people  at  the  beginning  of  their  educational  career,  but  they  are  also  not  affected  by  past 
educational choices. Second, the impact of each reform is identified by means of a diff‐in‐diff 





































c)  a  third  group  of  reforms  obtain  a  reduction  in  the  mean  accompanied  by  an  increase  in 















                                                 

















Pre‐primary expansion     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Pre‐primary school teacher qualification     restrictive ? ( mean dispersion) 
Duration compulsory education     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Beginning age of compulsory education     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Leaving age of compulsory education     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Primary school teacher qualification      selective ( mean  dispersion) 
Secondary school teacher qualification     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Tracking age     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Standardised test (for career advancement)     restrictive ( mean  dispersion) 
Standardised test (for other purposes)     selective ( mean  dispersion) 
School evaluation     selective ( mean  dispersion) 
School autonomy     selective ? ( mean  dispersion) 
Teacher autonomy     selective ( mean  dispersion) 
Selectivity in university access     restrictive ( mean  dispersion) 
Expansion of university access     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Increase grant size     selective ( mean  dispersion) 
Loan component to grant component      inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 
Interest rate     inclusive ( mean  dispersion) 

















factors  analysis  to  original  reform  measures  extracting  factors  that  we  consider  as  better 
accounting  of  institutional  reforming  activities  prevailing  in  European  countries  over  the  last 
century.  We  will  show  that  these  latent  variables  (which  are  nothing  more  than  linear 
combinations of original ones) have consistent impacts on educational attainment and inequality.  
                                                 
37 Given 20 potential regressors, the number of all possible groups of regressors of variable size is given by the 























i i i i i
N .  However,  if  we  include  all  the  19  reform  variables 









preferred  to  partition  the  entire  list  into  subgroups,  which  in  our  opinion  are  sufficiently 
homogenous, then retaining the first factor only.
38 The subgroup are formed according to the area 














system.  The  second  factor  (named  comprehensive)  summarises  the  contribution  of  policies 
intended to retain students within the schools; it accounts for 59% of the overall variance. The 





notion  of  inclusive  reforms,  because  they  mostly  succeed  through  raising  the  educational 
attainment of low achievers. 
 
The  fourth  group  (indicated  as  accountability)  consists  of  reforms  associated  to  measuring 
student/school performances in order to provide more teacher/school autonomy; the extracted 
factor accounts for half of the original variance. The fifth group (named teacher qualification) 
includes  all  reforms  associated  to  rises  in  required  qualification  for  teachers,  at  different 











student  access  to  tertiary  education  (despite  emerging  as  selective  in  previous  analysis  –  see  also  the  specific 
discussion  about  this  variable);  “secondary  school  teacher  qualification”  has  been  grouped  together  with  other 
variables concerned with teacher qualifications at other stages of education (despite appearing as inclusive in our 
analysis). Finally, “selectivity in university access” is clearly a selective policy, but has been left with the group of 




















Compulsory   1  2.056 0.685  Duration compulsory school  0.999 
  2  0.944 1  Beginning age of comp. education  -0.501 
  3  0 1  Leaving age of comp. education  0.898 
24 
Comprehensive  1 1.761 0.587  Pre‐primary expansion  0.807 
  2 0.707 0.823  Tracking age  0.703 
   3 0.532  1 Expansion of university access  0.785 
24 
University support 1  1  1.705 0.426  Selectivity university access  0.49 0.70 
University support 2  2  1.128 0.708  Increase grant size  0.31 0.56 

























Accountability   1  2.445 0.489  Standardised tests (for career adv)  0.567 
  2  0.941 0.677  Standardised tests (for other purp) 0.551 
  3  0.734 0.824  School evaluation  0.79 
  4  0.561 0.936  School autonomy   0.828 
   5  0.319 1  Teacher autonomy   0.714 
24 
Teacher qualification  1  2.126 0.709  Pre‐primary teacher qualification  0.755 
  2  0.622 0.916  Primary teacher qualification  0.916 
   3  0.252 1  Secondary teacher qualification  0.847 
24 
University autonomy   1  5.448  0.778  Budget autonomy   0.874 
  2  0.459  0.844  Recruitment autonomy   0.864 
  3  0.325  0.89  Organization autonomy  0.947 
  4  0.282  0.931  Logistic autonomy   0.912 
  5  0.238  0.965  Course autonomy   0.894 










































of  the  graph  is  that  European  educational  systems  underwent  significant  reforms  during  last 
century, and nevertheless they followed different orientations. If we take the zero value as a 















































































































































































selective/restrictive  policies  factor  (see  table  B6  in  Appendix  B).  By  construction,  the  original 









                                                 






































































implying  that  low  to  middle  achievers  are  the  main  target  of  the  policies,  since  they  exhibit 
stronger impact than people from better backgrounds. On the contrary for selective policies we 
observe  diversified  patterns,  depending  on  the  variable  considered:  teacher  qualification  and 
accountability exhibit a declining trend, thus negatively affecting the educational attainment of 









   inclusive reforms  selective reforms 
   compulsory comprehensive  university 
support 1 
university 




   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)  
Graduate parent   3.260***  3.094***  3.232***  3.012***  2.916***  3.138***  3.172*** 
    [0.042] [0.042] [0.050]  [0.055]  [0.039]  [0.043]  [0.051] 
Reform (factor)  0.210***  0.086***  0.036  -0.243***  0.185***  0.095***  0.027 
    [0.027] [0.025] [0.071]  [0.050]  [0.038]  [0.025]  [0.027] 
                  
Observations  329,102 329,102 224,969  224,969  329,102  329,102  240,482 
R²  0.260 0.259 0.290  0.288  0.259  0.259  0.284 













reduction  for  compulsory  and  comprehensive  factors,  while  again  university  support2  factor 
behaves  consistently  as  a  factor  belonging  to  the  group  of  selective  reforms.  The 





    Inclusive reforms  Selective reforms 












         
Mean years of education  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.064*** 0.057*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.081***  Share of people wth graduate parent 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Reform (factor)  -0.004*** -0.009***  -0.005  0.006***  0.012*** -0.005***  0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
         
Observations  3,368 3,368 2,271 2,271 3,368 3,368 2,461 















































































right-wing orientation of the government (Döring and Manow 
2010)  5.119  1.506  0.775  1.308 0 8.154  928 24 
right-wing orientation of the parliament (Döring and Manow 2010)  5.095  0.756  0.648  0.558 0 7.194  928 24 
cabinet support in the parliament (Döring and Manow 2010)  0.562 0.124  0.07  0.097 0.123  1  928  24 
political complexion of parliament and government (Woldendorp, 
Keman and Budge 2000 – rank-reversed for comparability)   5.8 1.895  1.069  1.666  2  10  940  24 
Log of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices 
(Penn World Tables v.7.00)  9.604  0.5  0.33  0.411 7.869 10.71  963  24 
Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per 






political  orientation  of  policy  makers.  Given  data  availability,  we  also  control  for  strength  of 
cabinets in parliament by taking the share of seats taken by parties supporting a cabinet over the 

















                                                 
45 The original coding is reversed and halved, but we have converted it for ease of comparability with the variable from 
























right-wing orientation of the government   1           
right-wing orientation of the parliament   0.6440*  1         
cabinet support in the parliament   -0.0322  -0.0755*  1       
political complexion of parliament and government   0.7255*  0.3973*  -0.1316*  1     
log gdp per capita  -0.0225  0.1669*  -0.1020*  -0.1587*  1   
























1940 1960 1980 2000
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where  c and  t denote country and year respectively,  ct R  is our outcome of interest (the factor 
extracted from the reform variables),  ct W  is the political orientation of either the cabinet or the 
parliament in office,  ct Z  are potentially confounding factors controlling against the risk of spurious 48 
 
correlation (GDP per capita at PPP US 2005 dollars, share of public expenditure on GDP),  c   and 








inclination  of  parliament  are  captured  by  unpredictable  variations  in  the  preference  of  the 
electorate exercising their voting rights. From this table we observe that educational reforms that 
we classified as inclusive (since they increase the mean educational attainment and reduce its 
dispersion,  thus  raising  the  bottom  tail  of  the  years  of  education  distribution)  are  negatively 
correlated with a right wing attitude of parliaments. This is mostly true for the compulsory factor 






















parliament  reinforces  our  claim  that  the  reforming  activity  variables  are  truly  exogenous  for 





  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 compulsory  comprehensi
ve  support 1  support 2  Inclusive  accountabili
ty  teacher  uniautonom
y  selective 
right-wing orientation of 
parliament   -0.186 -0.05  0.057  0.11 -0.091 0.066 0.074 0.125 0.105 
 [5.39]***  [1.15]  [2.08]**  [2.17]**  [3.10]***  [1.20]  [1.76]*  [2.79]***  [3.00]*** 
log gdp per capita  0.771  1.818 -2.209 -1.222 0.526 -0.616 0.784 -1.843 -1.135 
  [2.74]*** [6.74]*** [9.90]*** [3.21]*** [2.73]***  [1.44]  [2.58]** [4.34]*** [3.50]*** 
government share  -10.392  22.31 -6.225  18.591  5.905 0.568 6.496  5.51  5.299 
 [3.78]***  [10.53]***  [4.51]***  [7.43]***  [4.06]***  [0.18]  [2.72]***  [2.24]**  [2.85]*** 
Observations  843 843 770 770 770 843 843 781 781 
R²  0.858 0.909 0.941 0.888 0.933 0.871 0.879  0.86  0.913 

























finding  that  inclusive  policies  mostly  consists  of  interventions  on  the  length  of  compulsory 
















fixed  effects  to  take  care  of)  in  educational  investments,  schooling  can  be  affected  by  policy 
makers, who may alter both the level and the distribution. This fall‐back both on the economy, via 
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Country   ESS  EUSILC  IALS  ISSP  Total 
   
Austria  4 888 5 548 n.a. 1 358 11 794 
Belgium FL  3 456 3 387 1 373 n.a. 8 216 
Belgium FR  1 462 1 609 n.a. n.a. 3 071 
Czech Republic  5 015 4 868 2 536 3 094 15 513 
Denmark  4 760 2 524 2 420 n.a. 9 704 
Estonia  3 129 3 611 n.a. n.a. 6 740 
Finland  6 339 5 204 2 269 n.a. 13 812 
France  5 278 8 074 n.a. 1 422 14 774 
Great Britain  5 807 4 360 2 673 n.a. 12 840 
Germany  8 424 11 542 1 453 5 367 26 786 
Greece  5 411 6 778 n.a. n.a. 12 189 
Hungary  4 970 7 909 1 949 3 439 18 267 
Ireland  5 464 4 151 1 599 688 11 902 
Italy  2 181 26 854 2 404 n.a. 31 439 
Latvia  1 020 2 829 n.a. 894 4 743 
Netherlands  6 018 4 105 2 346 n.a. 12 469 
Northern Ireland  197 n.a. 2 032 n.a. 2 229 
Norway  5 404 n.a. 2 391 902 8 697 
Poland  5 217 21 696 2 238 4 290 33 441 
Portugal  6 192 4 957 n.a. 979 12 128 
Slovak Republic  3 819 7 626 n.a. 833 12 278 
Slovenia  4 053 3 917 1 978 3 203 13 151 
Spain  5 474 16 389 n.a. 855 22 718 
Sweden  5 437 1 957 1 931 876 10 201 
   











Pre‐primary expansion  ‐0.002  [0.002]  3 476  0.647 
Pre‐primary teacher qualification  0.002  [0.002]  3 476  0.556 
Beginning age of compulsory education  0.001  [0.001]  3 476  0.973 
Leaving age of compulsory education  0.005  [0.009]  3 476  0.695 
Duration compulsory school  0.009  [0.009]  3 476  0.706 
Primary teacher qualification  0.001  [0.002]  3 476  0.707 
Secondary teacher qualification  0.002  [0.002]  3 476  0.753 
Tracking age  ‐0.011  [0.012]  3 476  0.712 
Standardised tests (for career advancement)  0.002  [0.002]  3 476  0.524 
Standardised tests (for other purposes)  ‐0.001  [0.001]  3 476  0.311 
School evaluation  0.001  [0.001]  3 476  0.258 
School autonomy   0.005***  [0.001]  3 476  0.571 
Teacher autonomy   0.001  [0.002]  3 476  0.77 
Selectivity in university access  0.001  [0.003]  2 366  0.726 
Expansion of university access  ‐0.003  [0.002]  3 476  0.612 
Increase grant size  ‐0.001  [0.001]  2 366  0.278 
Loan component to grant component   0.000  [0.001]  2 366  0.938 
Interest rate  0.001  [0.001]  2 366  0.962 
Index of university autonomy  0.001  [0.002]  2 546  0.646 
 
Notes: robust standard errors in brackets ‐ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each row reports regressions with 




































              
ESS  Reform    0.248***  -0.319***  0.073*** 0.211 0.078*** 0.118 0.206** -0.004  -0.081 0.185** 
    [0.089] [0.076] [0.017] [0.183] [0.018] [0.079] [0.083] [0.018] [0.156] [0.093] 
  Obs.   52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586  52 586 
EUSILC  Reform    0.066 -0.112  0.065**  0.404*  0.072**  0.325***  0.106 -0.004 -0.471  0.583*** 
    [0.079] [0.082] [0.032] [0.245] [0.032] [0.121] [0.115] [0.032] [0.360] [0.148] 
  Obs.   91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359  91 359 
IALS  Reform    -0.004  -0.312*** 0.043 1.288*** 0.043 -0.212* -0.196  0.009 0.701*** -0.004 
    [0.147] [0.102] [0.031] [0.205] [0.031] [0.123] [0.122] [0.030] [0.158] [0.233] 
  Obs.   21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107  21 107 
ISSP Reform   0.225  -0.324*** -0.087** -2.601*** -0.087**  -0.242*  -0.202  0.017    -0.686 
    [0.157] [0.107] [0.038] [0.319] [0.038] [0.130] [0.165] [0.037]    [0.502] 
  Obs.   20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957  20 957 
              














Loan to grant 





              
ESS Reform    -0.449***  0.445*** -0.085 -0.204** 0.140  -0.011  -0.044 -0.330**  -0.677***   
    [0.126] [0.161] [0.146] [0.093] [0.086] [0.115] [0.149] [0.165] [0.255]   
  Obs.   52 586  52 586  52 586  33 331  52 586  38 346  33 331  33 331  33 331   
EUSILC  Reform    -0.904***  0.538*  -0.793***  -0.143 0.149 0.222 0.441 0.097  2.886***   
    [0.162] [0.286] [0.194] [0.129] [0.094] [0.182] [0.318] [0.366] [0.432]   
  Obs.   91 359  91 359  91 359  52 969  91 359  57 837  52 969  52 969  52 969   
IALS  Reform      -0.095 0.359  0.408**  0.098 0.137 0.141 0.457     
      [0.246] [0.263] [0.192] [0.179] [0.223] [0.404] [0.796]     
  Obs.   21 107  21 107  21 107  12 406  21 107  14 942  12 406  12 406  12 406   
ISSP Reform          -0.716*** -0.530*  0.424  -0.027  -1.348** -1.693**   
          [0.274] [0.281] [0.290] [0.651] [0.549] [0.810]   
































tests (for other 
purposes) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Graduate  parent    3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 
  [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
Reform 0.083**  0.054  -0.013  0.011  -0.015  -0.045  0.041  0.014**  -0.087  -0.119** 
  [0.034] [0.036] [0.010] [0.063] [0.010] [0.035] [0.033] [0.007] [0.061] [0.058] 
                                
Obs.  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269  312 269 
R²  0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
















Loan to grant 




  (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)    
Graduate  parent    3.454*** 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.515*** 3.454*** 3.516*** 3.515*** 3.515*** 3.491***   
  [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.051] [0.039] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.048]   
Reform 0.022  -0.092*  -0.072  -0.004  -0.054*  0.209**  0.153  0.175  -0.043   
  [0.071] [0.053] [0.045] [0.049] [0.030] [0.085] [0.116] [0.158] [0.068]   
             
Obs.  312 269  312 269  312 269  213 469  312 269  213 469  213 469  213 469  228 316   
R²  0.189 0.189 0.189 0.212 0.189 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.208   




































tests (for other 
purposes) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)  
Graduate  parent    3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482***  3.482*** 
  [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]  [0.029] 
Reform 0.006  -0.096**  -0.023**  -0.046  -0.022**  -0.079*  -0.019  -0.007  0.156***  -0.042 
  [0.040] [0.038] [0.010] [0.072] [0.011] [0.041] [0.037] [0.007] [0.056]  [0.065] 
                                
Obs.  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284  323 284 
R²  0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159  0.159 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
















Loan to grant 




  (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)    
Graduate  parent    3.482*** 3.482*** 3.482*** 3.477*** 3.482*** 3.477*** 3.477*** 3.477*** 3.462***   
  [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.034] [0.029] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033]   
Reform -0.055  -0.156**  -0.038  0.061  0.073**  -0.047  0.098  -0.090  -0.080   
  [0.072] [0.073] [0.058] [0.051] [0.036] [0.090] [0.115] [0.135] [0.066]   
             
Obs.  323 284  323 284  323 284  222 614  323 284  222 614  222 614  222 614  235 882   
R²  0.159 0.159 0.159 0.161 0.159 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.160   















Inclusive  1  3.601  0.360  Duration compulsory school  0.837 
  2  1.952  0.555  Beginning age of comp. education  ‐0.234 
  3  1.168  0.672  Leaving age of comp. education  0.874 
  4  0.970  0.769  Pre‐primary expansion  0.720 
  5  0.834  0.853  Tracking age  0.572 
  6  0.517  0.904  Expansion of university access  0.820 
  7  0.466  0.951  Selectivity university access  0.541 
  8  0.252  0.976  Increase grant size  0.299 
  9  0.238  1.000  Loan to grant component   0.372 
  10  0.000  1.000  Interest rate  0.210 
Selective  1  7.637  0.509  Standardised tests (for career adv)  7.637 
  2  1.628  0.618  Standardised tests (for other purp)  1.628 
  3  1.330  0.706  School evaluation  1.330 
  4  0.854  0.763  School autonomy   0.854 
  5  0.671  0.808  Teacher autonomy   0.671 
  6  0.561  0.845  Pre‐primary teacher qualification  0.561 
  7  0.484  0.878  Primary teacher qualification  0.484 
  8  0.388  0.904  Secondary teacher qualification  0.388 
  9  0.341  0.926  Budget autonomy   0.341 
  10  0.296  0.946  Recruitment autonomy   0.296 
  11  0.229  0.961  Organization autonomy  0.229 
  12  0.199  0.974  Logistic autonomy   0.199 
  13  0.177  0.986  Course autonomy   0.177 
  14  0.123  0.995  Self‐evaluation   0.123 




















              
Austria 0.23  -0.77  -1.16  0.16  0.19  -0.14  -0.46 
Belgium FL  0.44  0.27  -1.26  -0.14  0.37  0.25  -0.32 
Belgium FR  0.44  0.82  0.44  -1.30  0.51  -0.04  -0.08 
Czech  republic  0.37  0.21 na na  -0.21  0.97  -0.33 
Denmark  -0.85  0.30  0.88 -0.31 0.00  0.16 -0.06 
Estonia  -0.27  0.65 na na  -0.20  -0.28  na 
Finland -0.53  0.00  1.49  0.25  -0.42  -0.47  0.11 
France  0.38  -0.52  -0.31 -0.55  0.14  -0.33 -0.20 
Germany 0.16  -0.40  0.71  -0.75  -0.60  0.47  0.04 
Great Britain  1.14  -0.15  0.19  1.01  0.56  -0.30  0.57 
Greece  -0.56 -0.11  -1.00 0.48 -0.53 0.10 -0.05 
Hungary 0.70  -0.54  na  na  -0.08  -0.38  na 
Ireland 0.16  -0.48  -0.81  0.97  -0.17  0.05  0.57 
Italy  -0.80  0.10  -0.37 -0.73 -0.45 -0.44 -0.30 
Latvia  -0.30  0.39 na na  -0.25  0.36  na 
Netherlands 0.39  -0.38  0.53  -0.74  1.15  -0.55  -0.03 
Northern Ireland  0.66  -0.69  0.35  1.35  1.20  -0.32  0.57 
Norway -0.14  0.41  1.45  0.09  -0.44  -0.12  -0.11 
Poland  0.30  0.74 na na  -0.35  0.67  na 
Portugal -1.57  -0.27  -0.96  0.64  0.11  -0.56  -0.26 
Slovak  Republic 0.43  0.37 na na  -0.32  0.65  na 
Slovenia  -0.10  0.40 na na  -0.27  0.04  na 
Spain  -0.49 -0.50  -1.05 0.36 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 









  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 compulsory  comprehensive  support1 support2 inclusive  accountability  teacher uniautonomy  selective 
0.063 -0.116 -0.089  0.133  -0.036  0.041  -0.052  0.007  -0.003  right-wing orientation of the 
government   [4.49]*** [9.29]*** [4.06]***  [6.35]***  [3.72]*** [2.06]** [4.71]*** [0.46]  [0.25] 
Observations  928  928  852 852 852 928 928 863 863 
R² 0.54  0.692  0.197  0.42  0.768  0.529  0.741  0.641  0.73 
 compulsory  comprehensive  support1 support2 inclusive  accountability  teacher uniautonomy  selective 
0.066 -0.118 -0.089  0.133  -0.036  0.043  -0.053  0.007  -0.003  right-wing orientation of the 
cabinet  [4.70]*** [9.53]*** [4.35]***  [6.39]***  [3.85]*** [2.13]** [4.86]*** [0.48]  [0.24] 
0.902  -0.939  -2.4 -0.326 -0.68  0.884 -0.507 -0.82 -0.527  cabinet support in the 
parliament   [5.60]*** [5.89]*** [9.22]*** [1.63] [5.45]***  [4.52]***  [3.78]***  [5.25]***  [3.96]*** 
Observations  928  928  852 852 852 928 928 863 863 
R-squared  0.553  0.704  0.279 0.421 0.776 0.537 0.744 0.648 0.733 
 compulsory  comprehensive  support1 support2 inclusive  accountability  teacher uniautonomy  selective 
0.142 -0.38 -0.123  0.83  -0.111  0.191  -0.017  0.344  0.268  right-wing orientation of the 
parliament   [4.89]*** [9.35]*** [2.38]**  [12.50]***  [4.44]*** [4.86]***  [0.62]  [7.44]*** [6.61]*** 
Observations  928  928  852 852 852 928 928 863 863 
R²  0.54  0.724  0.187 0.562 0.769 0.537 0.735 0.669 0.748 
  compulsory comprehensive  support1  support2 inclusive  accountability  teacher uniautonomy  selective 
0.017 -0.053 -0.062  0.076  -0.025  0.013  -0.019  0.007  0.004  political complexion of 
parliament and government   [1.30] [4.72]***  [3.85]***  [4.49]***  [3.14]***  [0.80] [1.99]** [0.56] [0.34] 
Observations  940  940  873 873 873 940 940 884 884 
R²  0.533  0.68  0.163 0.404 0.767 0.534 0.734 0.651 0.738 
Robust t statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
constant and country-specific time trend included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 